Compile-time specialization and feature pruning through static binary rewriting have been proposed repeatedly as techniques for reducing the attack surface of large programs, and for minimizing the trusted computing base. We propose a new approach to attack surface reduction: dynamic binary lifting and recompilation.
INTRODUCTION
As a software program evolves over time, developers often introduce additional features to address various user expectations and to improve compatibility with other software or hardware. Many of these additional features remain unused by regular users, however, and security vulnerabilities in them often remain undiscovered for years. In a recent study, Wagner et al. found that 83% of security vulnerabilities that were assigned a CVE number in 2014 laid in âĂĲcold codeâĂİ [33] . To discover bugs lurking in cold code, one current practice is to insert sanity checks into a program using dynamic bug detection tools (e.g., sanitizers), and to fuzz the program or run test cases to exercise all parts of the program. As program complexity grows, these approaches are less suitable for detecting bugs hidden in deep execution paths.
An alternative approach to eliminate latent bugs is to specialize the program for specific use cases through manual feature pruning [24] , compile-time specialization [22] , or link-time code compaction [9] . Assisted by either static or dynamic analysis to determine which features are unnecessary for the target use case, these techniques can achieve substantial reductions of the program's code size, while also removing the features that are the most likely to contain security vulnerabilities. The downside of these techniques is that they are heavily tailored to the kernel, exploiting the fact that the kernel has a small set of easily recognizable interfaces to external code (i.e., user-space programs, peripheral devices, etc.), and thousands of preprocessor options to enable or disable features at the source code level.
We propose a more generic approach for attack surface reduction that works for binary commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) programs. Instead of trying to find vulnerabilities in cold code, or running coarse-grained analyses to identify unnecessary features and remove them at compile time, we use fine-grained dynamic profiling to determine with greater precision which parts of a program's code are actually used. We then lift these parts of the code into a compiler intermediate representation (IR) format, and use a mainstream compiler to compile the IR to a new binary executable.
We also present BinRec, a framework that implements our proposed approach. BinRec is a binary program recovery and recompilation framework that combines dynamic profiling with multipath exploration to lift machine instructions to compiler IR. It then transforms the IR using compiler passes (e.g., to optimize and harden the recovered program), and recompiles it to executable code. To reduce the attack surface exposed by unwanted program features, we selectively recover only the essential parts of the program based on execution tracing and symbolic execution. Preliminary results show that BinRec effectively reduces the attack surface, and enables complex transformations using existing compiler passes.
To summarize, our contributions are threefold:
• We present a novel approach to attack surface reduction through binary recovery, combining selective binary lifting with program analysis and transformation at the level of compiler IR, based on dynamic profiling.
• We implement our approach in BinRec and apply our framework to real-world COTS binaries.
• Our results show that BinRec successfully reduces the attack surface in the recovered binary by removing unused program paths and by reducing the number of ROP gadgets.
BACKGROUND
There are several existing efforts attempting binary recovery or recompilation, but their specific aims vary. Some solutions provide static reassembleable disassembly [34] , but they are not conservative and, without lifting to IR, they do not provide access to powerful compiler-level analysis. Revgen [11] and Dagger [5] can disassemble binaries to LLVM bitcode, but the IR they produce contains machine specific constructs and unresolved control flow. It would require extensive tool-specific analyses and transformations before that IR could be coherently understood by off-the-shelf compiler analyses. SecondWrite [3] and McSema [16] 3 BINREC DESIGN Figure 1 shows an overview of the BinRec framework, consisting of three components: a front-end that lifts machine code to compiler IR, a transformation component that rewrites the IR in any way desired (e.g., compiler optimizations, security hardening, etc.), and a back-end that compiles the transformed IR back to machine code and produces an executable binary. At a high level, BinRec works as follows. First, the lifting front-end executes the given program binary with concrete inputs in a virtual environment. At the same time, it also selectively invokes symbolic execution to discover possible execution paths that may be reachable with other legitimate program inputs. The front-end lifts all the program paths visited during both the concrete and symbolic execution, and turns them into IR snippets. It then removes any dependency with the virtual environment from the lifted IR and merges them into a single IR module that can be analyzed by the subsequent transformation passes. The transformation component can incorporate any technique that operates on compiler IR, including existing optimization and security hardening passes. Finally, the back-end component removes any remaining instrumentation added by the front-end, and compiles the final IR to machine code using the compiler. Unlike traditional binary recovery tools, BinRec does not aim to maximize code coverage. Instead, it aims to reduce the program's attack surface by removing rarely executed code paths. With this strategy, however, the recovered binary may not include all the necessary program functionality, especially when the recovered binary is later executed with untested program inputs. To guarantee that the recovered binary will execute correctly, we enforce a fallback to the original code whenever it hits execution paths removed from the recovered binary. Thanks to our trace-based lifting, fallbacks should not occur frequently. We can therefore afford to embed heavyweight (i.e., slow) security mechanisms in the fallback code, which allows us to further reduce the program's attack surface.
Lifting binary code to compiler IR
We discover additional possible execution paths by performing multi-path recovery of the input binary. To do so, we employ symbolic execution [8, 21] , a well-known technique to find software bugs by replacing memory values with symbolic expressions. To ensure conservativeness, we must handle all execution paths that both the profile runs and symbolic execution missed in a conservative manner. In other words, the binary should detect a deviation from the observed code paths and take the appropriate action (e.g., jump to to existing machine code in the input binary).
We base our design on a lifting front-end that lifts machine code to IR using a virtual machine for program isolation. The frontend produces IR that is specific to the execution environment. For instance, both data and code pointers are put as constants in the IR. This also holds true for position independent code (PIC), which normally uses only offsets relative to the location of the program. This means that our design supports the lifting of PIC binaries by fixing the code and data locations that were used during tracing, and thereafter accessing them in an address dependent manner.
Ensuring conservative program behavior
While trace-based lifting of BinRec is mainly designed for attack surface reduction, it can also be used for aggressive input-specific optimizations. BinRec features a configurable fallback mechanism that facilitates both uses cases. With the fallback enabled, the recovered program diverts any control flow edge that ventures outside of the recovered CFG to the corresponding machine code in the input binary. The fallback mechanism currently supports four modes:
(1) disabled No fallback, inputs that require control flow transfers outside the recovered path trigger undefined behavior. This allows for aggressive optimization, but does not preserve program behavior for all inputs. (2) error Unknown control flow transfers trigger an error. This is used when a fallback is not desired (e.g., because the code is only considered secure in the instrumented path), but the input cannot be controlled to always be confined to the recovered path (which the disabled mode requires). (3) standard Any unknown control transfer jumps to the corresponding instruction in the existing code of the input binary. The binary maintains a jump table of code pointers to all recovered basic blocks. The target of the control flow transfer is first checked to exist in the jump table-to stay in the recovered path for as long as possible-and execution moves to existing code only in case of a miss. (4) replaced Based on standard mode, but we also modify the existing code in the input binary to jump to recovered code for a selected set of code addresses (which defaults to all recovered code addresses). This enforces execution of lifted code for the selected addresses, while conservatively maintaining all original behavior of the binary. replaced mode is not yet implemented in our current prototype.
Intuitively, the attack surface is enlarged when adding code to a binary while also leaving the original code in place, as is done by the standard fallback mode. Depending on the type of attack surface reduction desired, however, the original code can be modified to mitigate attacks. For instance, when implementing memory safety or control flow integrity, the original code can be monitored by a heavyweight binary instrumentation framework. The recovered code constitutes a fast path in this case in which instrumentation is efficiently embedded within the recovered IR before recompilation. When reducing the amount of ROP gadgets, on the other hand, one would use the error mode and remove the original code sections.
Deinstrumentation
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Producing an executable binary
The back-end component removes any remaining instrumentation added by the front-end, and compiles the rewritten IR to machine code. Although lifted instructions are ready for compilation to standalone machine code, dependencies on data and external functions from the original program are still unresolved in the resulting binary. Uroberos [34] attempts to find and replace such references in the code with position-independent references in the output binary. They rely on the assumption that all such references can be found, which is not guaranteed in all use cases we aim to support. Instead, we follow the more conservative approach of SecondWrite [3] , which embeds sections from the input binary in the recovered IR and enforces linkage at the original base addresses.
executor. Selective symbolic execution successfully combines multipath exploration with dynamic analysis of binary executables while lifting code to compiler-level IR. This makes S 2 E a solid foundation for our binary recovery framework. On top of S 2 E, we have implemented a plugin that logs the generated LLVM IR. The logged IR is decoupled from the S 2 E runtime state by our deinstrumentation engine, as exemplified in Figure 2 . The engine implements the disabled, error, and standard modes of BinRec's fallback mechanism. When enabled, it directs all control flow edges with unknown targets in the logged IR to a trampoline. The trampoline copies lifted register values to physical registers before jumping to the corresponding code address in the original code of the binary.
EVALUATION
We evaluated BinRec by lifting binaries and running them on a system with 32GB RAM, and an Intel i7-6700 processor running at 3.4GHz with frequency scaling turned off. We used gcc 4.8.4 to compile programs to 32-bit x86 binaries.
We first evaluate the correctness and performance of a number of binaries from the SPEC-CPU2006 benchmarking suite, recovered by BinRec. Since KLEE does not support floating-point operations, S 2 E implements these by emulation in integer operations. As this significantly degrades floating-point performance, we only evaluate the CINT subset of SPEC to obtain an accurate view of any instrumentation overhead.
Furthermore, we disable symbolic execution to assert that we evaluate correctness and performance of the recovered binary within the exact same code path followed by the original binary.
Correctness
We evaluated the correctness of the recovered binaries by running single-path binary recovery and comparing the behavior of the recovered binary with that of the input binary. Each program binary is lifted using its first reference input available in the SPEC-CPU2006 benchmark suite. If binary recovery is performed successfully and the same inputs are specified, the recovered binary must exercise exactly the same code paths as during recovery, not requiring the fallback mechanism. We use the error path of the fallback mechanism to test this behavior, and verify that the recovered and input binaries have the same output. We have compiled the 12 programs from the CINT set without optimizations and with full optimization (-O0 and -O3), resulting in 24 input binaries. 9 of these do not work as expected for varying reasons:
• omnetpp, gcc, xalancbmk and gobmk-O3 trigger incorrectly ordered execution events in S 2 E, causing successor information to be recorded incorrectly. This leads to a fallback.
• perlbench triggers incorrect disassembly by S 2 E due to a bug that causes an off-by-one error in the program counter.
The remaining 15 binaries all correctly follow the original code path, i.e., no fallback is detected. In order to measure the performance of the fallback mechanism, we have also recovered the remaining binaries with the fallback mechanism disabled, and again verified the results. bzip2-O3 crashes when the fallback mechanism is disabled, due to a nontrivial over-optimization bug. This leaves a total of 29 output binaries for our performance evaluation. Figure 3 shows the runtime performance of recovered binaries compared to the respective input binaries. All recovered binaries have been optimized after lifting. For some unoptimized binaries, this leads to a significant speedup (bzip2, mcf, hmmer and sjeng, the latter only with fallback disabled). For most binaries, however, binary recovery incurs a slowdown. Manual inspection shows this is the case because LLVM optimizations cannot effectively track variable values on the stack, and thus keep them in memory rather than in registers after recompilation. The geometric mean of normalized runtimes for unoptimized (O0) binaries are 1.02 and 0.97 with the fallback mechanism enabled and disabled respectively. For optimized (O3) binaries, the geometric means are 1.44 and 1.39 respectively. We believe this to be an acceptable baseline instrumentation overhead given that (i) existing binary rewriting also introduce overhead but without allowing for IR-level transformations [34] and (ii) additional optimizations unique to our particular setting (e.g., profile-guided optimizations) are possible.
Performance

Attack Surface Reduction
Although progress is being made at quantifying the attack surface of the kernel [22] , we are not aware of any universally accepted attack surface reduction metrics for user-space code. We therefore chose to measure the attack surface of the recovered programs by calculating the fraction of original program instructions that are lifted to IR code, and by comparing the number of ROP gadgets in the recovered code with the number of gadgets in the original code. Table 1 shows our findings. We evaluated only benchmarks that can be correctly recovered by BinRec; all input binaries are optimized (O3). Each program binary is lifted using all reference inputs available in the SPEC CPU 2006 benchmark suite. We then measured geometric means of results from different reference inputs. astar, for example, has two reference inputs BigRakes2048 and rivers, thereby two recovered binaries were generated and measured for this benchmark. Using BinRec, only 28% of the original instructions are lifted to LLVM IR on average. We measured ROP gadget reduction in the recovered binaries using a ROP gadget finder tool called Ropper [2] . We found that the BinRec recovered binaries contain 48% fewer ROP gadgets than the original binaries. 
RELATED WORK
BinRec is not the first to address the problem of binary rewriting or code lifting. We now summarize related work.
Attack surface reduction. Previous work on attack surface reduction primarily targets the Linux kernel. Not all of these works targeted attack surface reduction specifically, but achieved it nonetheless as a side effect of code compaction. Lee et al., for example, constructed call graphs to identify dead code in the kernel, and then manually pruned this code at the source level [24] . Chanet et al. used a variety of static analyses, including constant propagation, to specialize the kernel for a given kernel command line [9] . Contrary to the aforementioned work by Lee et al., this solution operates at link time and is fully automated. He et al. analyze and compact the kernel at the source code level, and propose to leverage approximate decompilation and FA-analysis to incorporate the effects of hand-written assembly snippets into static analysis results [18] . More recently, Kurmus et al. used dynamic tracing to determine which kernel functionality is necessary to support a given system workload [22] . They then correlated the trace information to source lines, and subsequently calculated the minimal set of compile-time configuration options that must be enabled to generate a kernel that incorporates all the necessary functionality.
Low-level binary analysis and rewriting. Many projects target the problem of low-level binary analysis and rewriting. PEBIL [23] , UQBT [13] and Uroboros [34] all statically rewrite binary programs either at the machine code level or using a custom low-level IR. Their main aim is to support the insertion of simple instrumentation where efficiency is more important than the ability to perform complex code transformations, such as altering the CFG. BISTRO [14] allows extracting and embedding functional components within binaries, and when combined with an analysis and concretization scheme such as one proposed by [20] can provide binary feature customization. While it targets advanced analysis, rather than code rewriting (as we do)), angr [31] bundles numerous static and dynamic analysis techniques, including symbolic execution.
Earlier work such as ATOM [17] , PLTO [28] , Diablo [27] , and Vulcan [32] are powerful tools, but to our knowledge they do not work well with stripped binaries. Also, like dynamic instrumentation tools, they typically do not support a generic compiler-level IR. Dynamic instrumentation tools like PIN [25] , Dyninst [6] , DynamoRIO [1] and Valgrind [26] are dynamic binary analysis tools, providing runtime APIs to analyse and instrument code at runtime. They do not use a compiler-level IR, and since they lack the recompilation phases, they are weaker in applying advanced analysis or optimization passes.
Binary code lifting. LLBT [29, 30] statically retargets binaries to different ISAs after lifting them to LLVM IR. MC-Semantics [16] , Dagger [5] and RevNIC [10] (which is based on S 2 E) raise machine code for the purpose of high-level static binary translation on LLVM IR. SecondWrite [3] successfully recompiles real-world binaries after statically lifting them to LLVM IR, rejuvenating them by applying existing compiler optimizations. Such projects are limited by their static analysis and cannot handle complex program code such as highly optimized binaries, special idioms, etc. They are all based on static analysis. In addition, even the most advanced solution, SecondWrite, currently cannot cope with position-independent code. Finally, HQEMU [19] extends the QEMU code generation back-end to lift code to LLVM IR similarly to S 2 E (and therefore BinRec), for the purpose of optimization. It does not decouple lifted code from the QEMU runtime to produce a standalone executable binary, like BinRec.
CONCLUSION
We presented BinRec, a new solution for attack surface reduction based on binary analysis and rewriting. BinRec recovers only an essential part of the program by capturing execution traces and discovering more execution paths reachable through symbolic execution. Our experiment shows that BinRec successfully removes over 70% of the original instructions while preserving the program's functionality, and that the BinRec recovered binaries contain nearly 50% less ROP gadgets. To implement a conservative recompilation strategy, BinRec relies on fallback code to handle residual binary code that did not execute during profiling. Since the program rarely reaches the fallback code, we can apply slower yet stronger hardening solutions to the fallback code, e.g., precise control-flow integrity instrumentation. Applying such hardening techniques to fallback code will allow us to further reduce the attack surface.
